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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA KOCHA,
 p W w ( , . f f 
VS. 
GIBSON PRODUCTS COMPANY, 




MAYTEX MANUFACTURING COM- )
 1 3 8 8 7 ' 
PANY, A Texas Corporation, [ 
Third-Party Plaintiff Appellant, 
. . vs. 
UNIVERSAL CARRIER COMPANY, 
A Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Maytex Manufac-
turing Company, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant, against Universal Carrier Company, Third-
Party Defendant-Respondent wherein the Maytex Manu-
facturing Company, hereinafter referred to as Maytex, 
was named as a Defendant in a personal injury action 
brought by Norma Kocha for injuries allegedly suffered 
1 
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by that Plaintiff as a business invitee on the premises of 
the Gibson Discount Center. Maytex thereafter brought 
this action against the Universal Carrier Company, here-
inafter referred to as Universal, for indemnity in the 
event that the Plaintiff successfully recovered against 
the Defendant Maytex. 
, DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon the filing of Defendant Maytex's Third-Party 
Complaint against Universal, Universal, by SPECIAL 
APPEARANCE made a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION. The trial court with the 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, sitting as a Judge of the 
Third Judicial District, granted UniversaPs Motion to 
Dismiss and ruled that jurisdiction over Universal was 
lacking. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Universal Carrier Company seeks an 
affirmance of the Order of the District Court dismissing 
the Third-Party Complaint of the Appellant Maytex, for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS •< 
Respondent takes strong exception to Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. 
Because of the matters set forth in Point I of Re-
spondent's Argument hereinafter, the Respondent re-
spectfully submits that the Statement of Facts contained 
2 
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in Appellant's brief are without support in the record. 
Appellant cites as facts in its Statement of Facts, matters 
which axe purely and totally speculative and without 
support in the record on appeal, or in the record avail-
able to the trial court. The only facts existence in the 
record are that certain pleadings, with certain allega-
tions, were filed with the court (though those allegations 
amount to little more than hearsay); and that an Affi-
davit properly attested to and notarized was submitted 
by David J. Moorehead, Chairman of the Board of the 
Third-Party Defendant Universal Carrier Company. No 
Counter-Affidavits were filed by the Third-Party Plain-
tiff-Appellant, iv ,1 
Attention is drawn to Point I of Respondent's Argu-
ment for the support of prior decisions of this Honorable 
Court setting the standard for the determination of what 
items are to be considered facts on a motion such as 
Universal^ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
In accordance with those prior guidelines of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, the following are submitted 
as the facts existing in this case: 
(a) That the Plaintiff Norma Kocha filed a 
Complaint in the District court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about the 4th day of April, 
1974, against Gibson Products Company and the 
Maytex Manufacturing Company in which it was 
alleged that she, as a business invitee, was injured on 
•:•>' a wire merchandise rack owned by the Defendant 
Gibson and designed and manufactured by the De-
fendant Maytex. ;..:;. 
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(b) That the Defendant Maytex filed an Answer 
on or about the 10th day of June, 1974, in which it 
alleged that "This defendant is a Texas Corporation, 
not doing business in the State of Utah, and that 
the above-entitled Court is without jurisdiction," 
and entered a general denial of the allegations of 
Plaintiff's Complaint and entered other affirmative 
defenses against the Plaintiff. 
(c) That the Defendant Maytex Manufacturing 
Company, on or about the 10th day of June, 1974, 
filed a Third-Party Complaint against the Third-
Party Defendant, Universal in which it alleged: 
(1) That the plaintiff had filed a complaint 
against the defendant Maytex, 
(2) That the wire merchandise rack in ques-
tion was designed and manufactured by Uni-
versal and sold by the third-party defendant to 
the third-party plaintiff, 
(3) That if the plaintiff's allegations were 
true, jurisdiction existed over the third-party 
defendant Universal, and, 
(4) That in the event that plaintiff was suc-
cessful against the defendant Maytex that Uni-
versal would be liable to Maytex for the full 
amount of any such judgment. 
(d) That the Third-Party Defendant Universal 
was served with a copy of the Complaint and with a 
Summons in Texas on the 26th day of June, 1974, 
by a deputy of the Dallas County Sheriff's Depart-
ment 
4 
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•(e) That by SPECIAL APPEARANCE, the 
Third-Party Defendant Universal made a Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Lack of Jurisdic-
tion. - U ' .^.\;*\..*••::•>. yV.-;h •.•--.• 
(f) That the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent 
Universal acting through its Chairman of the Board, 
David J. Moorehead, filed an Affidavit, under oath, 
and properly notarized, with the Court which set 
forth the following facts:
 }_ 
: (1) That he is the chairman of the hoard of 
Universal Carrier Company which has its place 
of business at 614 Easy Street, Garland, Texas. 
(2) That at all times pertinent hereto, Uni-
versal Carrier Company was a Texas corpora-
tion which was not licensed to do business in 
the State of Utah, and which in fact does not 
sell its products to any buyers within the State 
of Utah. \ *
 ; 
(g) That thereafter a Memorandum in Support 
of Universal Carrier Company's Motion to Dismiss 
was filed and an argument thereon was held on the 
12th day of August, 1974, at the hour of 2:00 P.M., 
and that, thereafter, the Court entered an Order 
dismissing the Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant May-
tex's Complaint on the grounds that the court does 
not have jurisdiction over the Third-Party Defend-
ant, Universal Carrier Company. J 
No other facts appear in the record, and no other 
facts were presented by counsel for the parties. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
.Appellants contend in the Statement of Facts section 
of their brief, that the only issue on appeal is whether 
an intermediate seller (such as a wholesaler or distribu-
tor) of a allegedly defective product causing injury in 
Utah, can invoke long-arm jurisdiction over the designer 
and manufaeturer from which it purchased the product 
outside of the State. Respondent disagrees. 
There is no evidence in this case to the effect that 
the Appellant is "an intermediate seller" let alone a 
"wholesaler and distributor." Beyond that there is the 
issue of whether or not any evidence was presented to 
support the Appellant's position in the trial court which 
could have justified the trial court and finding other than 
it did. 
Therefore, Respondent contends that there are two 
issues on appeal. First the question of what facts were 
available to the trial court judge, and second, whether or 
not the long-arm statute conveys jurisdiction over the 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
POINT I. 
LOWER COURT HAD NO FACTS BEFORE IT 
DURING CONSIDERATION OF THIRD-PARTY DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION, OTHER THAN THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT. 
As indicated previously, the only Affidavit or other 
verified or attested to facts available to the court was 
the Affidavit of David J. Moorehead, Chairman of the 
Board of the Respondent. No affidavits, depositions, 
6 
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answers to interrogatories or any other such materials 
were filed by the Appellant Maytex. The Appellant 
Maytex is apparently relying on the allegations set forth 
in its Complaint, and in the Complaint of the Plaintiff 
Norma Koch a, as though they were facts. Under previous 
cases of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they are not 
allowed to do so. 
Rule 6D and Rule 43E of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures provide for the filing of Affidavits on mo-
tions such as Universale Motion to Dismiss in this mat-
ter. Rule 56E with reference to similar affidavits, states 
as follows: 
' ' Supporting and opposing affidavit shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as w o^uld be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. . . . The 
court may permit the affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affida^jjts. When a 
motion for summary judgmentarici supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, a summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him." 
Allegations in a Complaint or an Answer are not 
evidence. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Maytex's 
Third-Party Complaint in this matter is signed by the 
7 
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attorney for the Third-Party Plaintiff and it is not a 
verified Complaint. The information contained therein 
is at best hearsay, and it would not be admissible at time 
of trial. • 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides : 
"The signature of an attorney constitutes a cer-
tificate by him that he had read the pleading; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief there is good ground to support it, and that 
it is not interposed for delay." 
An attorney does not attest that all items contained in 
the Complaint, or other pleading signed by him, are true. 
Indeed in nearly all instances such signings of pleadings 
are based on hearsay information received from clients 
or other sources. 
The court has often had occasion to deal with and 
discus s affidavits or other testimony-type discovery 
matters where the evidence adduced by them would not 
be admissible at trial. In the 1972 case of Western States 
Thrift & Loan Company vs. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019, the court held that an Affidavit opposing 
a Motion for Summary Judgment must be made on the 
personal knowledge of the affiant and set forth facts 
which w o^uld be admissible in evidence. The court deter-
mined that the Affidavit in question was based on hear-
say and based on information and belief and that it thus 
did not conform to the requirements of the Rule to 
create a genuine issue of fact for trial sufficient to pre-
clude the entry of a Summary Judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff. 
8 
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In the 1971 case of ASM Enterprises, Inc. vs. 
Eunsaker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700, a similar result 
was held where the discovery device was Interrogatory 
Answers. In that matter the court held that Interroga-
tory Answers which were based upon hearsay statements 
and conclusions, and not based on personal actual knowl-
edge, should not be considered in determining whether 
or not there was a disputed issue of material fact. 
In the 1969 case of Rainford vs. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 
252, 451 P.2d 769, the court refused to accept a Defend-
ant's Affidavit which consisted of inadmissible parole 
evidence, and on that basis granted a Summary Judg-
ment in favor of the Plaintiffs. In that case the court 
stated as follows: 
"The action of the trial court in the instant case 
must be substained, since appellant's affidavit 
consisted entirely of inadmissible parole evidence, 
submitted for the purpose of varying and adding 
to the terms of the written agreement of the 
parties. An affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment to be effective must set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence." (At Page 255.) 
See also Walker vs. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corpora-
tion^ Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
The Third-Party Plaintiff - Appellant apparently 
feels that the mere assertion of an allegation in its Third-
Party Complaint raises that as a "fact" to be considered 
in any judicial determination relating to the case. Under 
the Utah case law, this is not so. This question was 
squarely faced in the 1966 case of Dnpler vs. Yates, 10 
9 
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Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624. In that case, an action by 
purchasers of interests in oil wells to recover damages 
for alleged fraud and deceit and breach of fiduciary rela-
tionship, the court held that allegations in pleadings are 
not sufficient to raise issues of fact. The court in the 
Dupler case stated as follows: 
"Certainly, if the summary judgment procedure is 
to be effective, it must be held that when ade-
quate proof is submitted in support of the motion, 
the pleadings are not sufficient to raise an issue 
, of fact." 
The court went on to spell out its reasons and justifica-
tion for that general rule as follows: 
"Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts 
ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the oppos-
ing party produce some evidentiary matter in con-
tradiction of the movent's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
Where as in the instant case the materials pre-
sented by the moving party are sufficient to 
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing 
^ party fails either to offer counter affidavits or 
other materials that raise a credible issue or to 
show that he has evidence not then available, 
summary judgment may be rendered for the mov-
ing party. 
The record made by the defendant in support 
of his motion for summary judgment, contro-
verted the unverified allegations in the plaintiff's 
amended complaint and therefore, in the absence 
of counter affidavits, no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact were created.'' 
See also 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed), at page 2067. 
10 
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This position has been upheld in more recent Utah 
Supreme Court cases such as Montoya vs. Berthana 
Investment Corporation, 21 Utah 2d 37, 439 P.2d 853 
(1968); and Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company vs. 
Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d 389 (1968). , , 
Most recently in the 1973 case of Clegg vs. Lee, 30 
Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, the court adhered to the rule 
set out in the Dnpler case and stated on page 247 as 
follows: 
"A matter may be determined on summary judg-
ment upon facts given in a party's deposition. 
Under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., an adverse party 
may not rely on mere allegations or denials in his 
pleadings, but he must set forth the facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact 
for trial.'' 
As the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction was a Motion that 
could be, and in fact became, dispositive of the case, it 
had to be approached on much the same grounds as would 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent filed an Affidavit, the only factual 
documents so submitted in this matter, and in so doing, 
contravened and cut across any and all allegations relat-
ing to jurisdiction set out by the Plaintiff or Third-Party 
Plain tiff-Appellant. Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant had 
opportunity to submit Counter Affidavits prior to the 
hearing of the matter, or during the period the court had 
the matter under advisement before decision, and they 
failed to do so. Thus the only facts present in the rec-
ord in this regard, are that the Third Party Def endant-
11 
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Respondent has its principal place of business in Texas 
and that it is not licensed to do business in Utah and in 
fact, does not sell its products to any buyers in the 
State of Utah. 
Appellant Maytex's statement of facts contains the 
following statement, "nor is there anything in the affi-
davit indicating that Universal did not purposefully 
intend its products to come into the State of Utah. Nor is 
there anything to indicate that the sale in question 
involved an isolated transaction; for all we know from 
the state of the record, the respondent may well have 
thousands of its manufactured products in use in stores 
throughout the State of Utah. All of these facts would 
have to be considered in the light most favorable to 
Maytex for the purpose of the motion to dismiss." We 
contend that these items cannot be considered in a "light 
most favorable to Maytex" because they are not facts. 
They are the purest kind of speculation without any 
evidentiary support whatever and, indeed, without even 
a previously stated allegation. The Third-Party Plain-
tiff-Appellant had an opportunity to produce Counter 
Affidavits or other evidence to the effect, that they 
could be obtained, and they failed to do so. There 
are no allegations, supported or unsupported as to the 
intent of Universal; there are no allegations, sup-
ported or unsupported, with reference to Universal^ 
regular business practices; there are no allegations, sup-
ported or unsupported, that Universal has any other of 
its products in Utah; and there are no allegations, sup-
ported or unsupported, setting forth the Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant's version of how this item might have 
come in to the State of Utah. 
12 
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To the respondent's knowledge there is only one case 
in Utah in which it was held that allegations in a Plain-
tiff's Complaint stood, as facts, in opposition to aver-
ments in the Affidavits supporting a defendant's motion 
thus raising a controverted issue of fact. This was in the 
1963 case of Christensen vs. Financial Service Company, 
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010. That case said that an 
adverse party on a Motion for Summary Judgment may 
serve opposing Affidavits but is not required to do so 
and that his pleadings could raise issues of fact preclud-
ing Summary Judgment. However, the Christensen case 
was recognized as being in opposition to the accepted and 
general rule nation-wide and the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in the 1968 case of United American Life 
Insurance Company vs. Willey, 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P.2d 
755, case virtually overruled the decision in the Christ en-
sen case. 
In the United American Life Insurance Company 
case the court cited the Christensen case and stated as 
follows: 
"When that case was decided, it placed Utah all 
by itself among the States of the Nation, and 
the sole associate it had in that regard was in 
the Third Federal Circuit. . . . Quite aside from 
having the distinction of causing Utah to be the 
only Soldier in the Nation to be 'in step' the case 
is now no authority for the claim made by appel-
lants for the reason that Eule 56(e) was amended 
in 1956 " 
Thus, it can be seen that nearly all of the evidentiary 
statements contained in appellant's brief on appeal are 
totally unsubstantiated by evidence. 
13 
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This is true of many of the statements made inAppel-
dant's STATEMENT OF FACTS as well as numerous 
such statements appearing in Appellant's AEGUMENT 
section. 
On page 9 of Appellant's brief, it states that Uni-
versal purposefully placed the rack in interstate com-
merce and that it was foreseeable that an injury could 
result in Utah. There is no evidence, nor even an allega-
tion, to support that statement. 
i Also on page 9 of Appellant's brief, it states: "It is 
undisputed that the Respondents are engaged in inter-
state commerce and are thus beneficiaries of the protec-
tion of the Utah State Laws." There is no evidence, nor 
even an allegation, in support of that statement. 
'. On pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's brief, they contend 
that while both the Appellant and Respondent are Texas 
corporations, their contacts with Utah are greater than 
any other sister state. There is no evidence, nor even an 
allegation, in support of that statement. 
On page 11 of Appellant's brief, it states," The manu-
facture of products sold in interstate commerce such as 
display racks for large merchandising stores has a sub-
stantial and continuing interest in marketing its products 
beyond the boundaries of the state where the manufac-
turing took place." There is no evidence, nor even an 
allegation, that that situation would apply to the Re-
spondent Universal. ,.,,- > 
14 
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On page 12 of Appellant's brief on appeal, it states 
that I niversal's product found its way into Utah in a 
'•natural, foreseeable and purposeful manner." There is 
no evidence, nor even allegation, m >uppur;. t»l* :hat staU? 
iilent either. 
The trial court i n this matter had no evidencr <• -M.-
kind eluded to and referred to in Appellant's brief, flic 
evidence and the record reflects no such facts. The trial 
court had only one evidentiary document. That ua> 
i ! i . Al<»uj"lir;i.r Affidavit. As such. 'M«- 'r-ai j-imrt md 
no alternative, •. ;";:- :]•« \<i - • *nadt ;. v :.i!..!-- :.. - . u;|i<*r 
than 4 : •!' -- .; .\ 'M .i;' ;l" "i i : i tdl , ;(- ;\ i ^H-n i;:nt ' '-
versa I and to decide that jurisdiction <IM P<4 IK> MI 
matter. Eespondent herein submits that iIn* situation 
has not changed since it was so reviewed by ilw M-ial 
court, and that, with the information available :.. it, tlie 
Suprenx * ^ - .- ^: - ii-rt ui:l< ) = •• <:ih r.;ui:\ - !ml !<> 
affirm • •:•• • if--?-,i-ti - - • M • ' - : ••••.n - ' 
POINT 
THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 27 TITLE 78 
U.C.A. (LONG-ARM STATUTE) DO NOT GIVE 
JURISDICTION OVER THE THIRD-PARTY DE-
FENDANT TO THE DISTRICT COI JRT. 
Univer^f .i Mi;.; * -1 * -. - -
 B :!iis regard took the 
position tliMi -:.:- Utah long-arm statute, 78-27-24, TT.C.A. 
(1953) as amended in I9(i9, did not apply as an applica-
tion that would include this service over Universal would 
not come wiuiin tin* guidelines of the F t ah Supreme 
Court case setting out the requirement !..» 'inin.inal 
contacts" and • . < - , • . - . > < I . -..-;« i'•< \ mh 
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State Legislature placed a limit on the boundaries of the 
long-arm statute by citing the due process clause directly. 
Respondent agrees with the statement in Appellant's 
brief that the long-arm statute was intended to "serve 
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants to the full-
est extent permitted by the due process clause. . . ." 
However, the respondent contends that the Utah cases on 
the matter have determined the boundaries of this appli-
cation. 
The question then is two-fold: Firs t did the action 
of Universal constitute the sufficient "minimal contact" 
to hold this court's jurisdiction as constitutional and 
within the express scope of the Utah Long-Arm Statute; 
and Second, does the wire rack allegedly manufactured 
by Universal after passing through intermediate hands 
and subsequently finding its way to Utah, create such 
a situation as to be included in those enumerated acts 
which subject a non-resident to the jurisdiction of this 
state's courts? 
If the only facts accepted in this action are the facts 
sot forth in Respondent's Statement of Facts, in accord-
ance with Point I of Respondent's argument herein, there 
could be no question but that those requirements are not 
satisfied, and that jurisdiction over this defendant does 
not lie. That would be so because the only facts in evi-
dence are that Universal is a Texas corporation, not 
doing business in Utah. 
However, even if we were to consider the actual 
allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint and of Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint in this matter, there 
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would still not be a justification I'm- holding thai in*-
State Courts have jurisdiction ov*»r 1h<* Respondent. 
Hypothetically, if we accept il"- allegations of TVnl 
Party Plaintiff Maytex's ' v : >hii)it. and m tin- t-xtcnt 
that they are applicable the allegations of plaintiff 
Kocha's Complaint, the most extensive contontinns we 
would have would *•« ••-- follows: 
1. That a wire merchandise >-.\ <i\ : tin-
tiff in Murrav, lTtah. 
2. That Universal -la;. t**\) designed arid manu-
facture! the IT.-K. 
3. That Universal sold the rack to Maytex. 
(There are no allegations relating to how the rack came 
into Utah, or where the rack was sold by Universal to 
Maytex, or \h:r Universal intended that tin- rack rome 
into Utah, .-.: Universal is engaged \u luiervratr 
commerce, or that uu\ *A\.i-v <>r -he products manufac-
tured by Universal are existent in the State of Utah.) 
Even if such items as are alleged in the above-referenced 
Complaints were admitted, they would still not meet the 
requirements of due process set out by the United States 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court v ! die State of 
Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court in iiti>-tnational 
Shoe Company vs. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
66 S.Ct. 154, (1945) set the standard as to what n,n-
nections the non-resident must have u«:!i Mn- forum 
state before that state can exercise jurisdiction over the 
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non-resident via its state courts. The court held that the 
due process clause required that the non-resident have 
certain minimal contacts with the forum state. The court 
said: 
". . . due process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, 
if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimal contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial just ice. '" 
The corporation in International Shoe seeking to defeat 
jurisdiction was a show manufacturing company and the 
court found jurisdiction based on the activities of the 
corporation in Washington State and accordingly its 
activities differ greatly from our situation, for in that 
case, International Shoe had salesmen in the State and 
such activities were regular and continuous, thus making 
the corporation amenable to process. In our situation, 
there are no salesmen, warehouses, outlets, manufactur-
ing or other activities which create any contact with the 
State of Utah. The only factor is that a wire rack ended 
up in Utah, not at the direction of the Universal, and it 
had passed through independent hands. Such a remote 
and isolated incident could not be construed as systematic 
and continuous so as to make Universal Carrier Company 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. 
The Court stated, in International Shoe, supra, with 
respect, to irregular and casual contact: 
". . . it has been generally recognized that the 
casual presence of the corporate agent or of activi-
18 
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ties in a state in the corporation's behalf are not 
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action 
unconnected with the activities there." 
ri 
*
kTo require the corporation in such circumstances 
to defend the suit away from its home or other 
jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial 
activities has been thought to lay too great and 
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to com-
port with due process." 
The mere fact that a vv ire rack happened to m a up in 
Utah does not constitute systematic and continuous oper-
ating within the State ;.:i.- - - : *. .ninimai ,<uiitaHs" 
requirement i- ••* - : •< r •'•ilional Shoe. p 
h o l d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n \< ;;nr exceed t!" ' m d - "f :a«-
p r o c e s s ami w ^ M • ••.•r:;jmv nffVnd :'.. •••>!!: a o:' f-nr 
p l a y Mini M I ! - !;;>•;.;.! j u s t i c e . " 
'!''.« • ' / l i S u p r e m e <'( ; :n i i ; t ? < ; i j t • . • <>n the scope a n d 
e x t e n ; H " ><•• ] .mu .\\i:-< S t a l u i < \ a : •: ;' f a s s t a t e d i t> 
p o s i t '-.«•. • *, •*•: • <;-ra- i n ] ; - . 
In G'emw. ys. If hit mo re, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 
871 (1959), a suit to enforce an Illinois judgment against 
a Utah resident, im- i -uii i *t«*;iis with 111*• (jiu->1 imj <>f w hat 
constituted ?. transacts - ^ business";.- it n-iaio t<i 
due process. ! court found that the actions of the Utah 
resident as they related to Illinois did not constitute the 
"transaction of business" and, therefore, subjecting the 
Utah resident to Illinois service of process and jurisdic-
tion did not conform with due process requirements. The 
actions of the Utah resident were conducted In mail and 
1 A 
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were a response to a solicitation via the mails from an 
Illinois resident to purchase a horse. The court found 
that these actions, including the inspection of the horse 
by a friend of the defendant in Illinois, did not constitute 
sufficient contact so as to invoke jurisdiction under the 
Illinois Long Arm Statute. 
Admittedly, in the Conn, case, the court was not 
construing the Utah statute. However, they were discuss-
ing the due process requirements involved in personam 
jurisdiction. This case set the stage for the case of Hill 
vs-, Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332, which 
followed in 1971. 
In the case of Hill vs. Zale Corporation, the 
Utah Supreme Court directly dealt with and examined 
Utah's Long Arm Statute. That case also involved a 
Texas corporation. In that case the plaintiff filed an 
action against the defendant seeking to recover for 
wages, an incentive award, vacation pay and moving 
expenses, totalling about $2,500 which he claimed were 
due for services rendered to the defendant in Anchorage, 
Alaska. In that case the defendant corporation brought 
an action to dismiss on the grounds that there had been 
no proper service of summons and upon a lack of juris-
diction. The trial court, the Honorable Gordon B. Hall 
presiding, dismissed the action stating: 
"That the defendant is a corporation duly organ-
ized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Texas and is not subject to service of process 
within the State of Utah." 
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The Supreme ( oint agreed with iht- triai rutin > 
view of the law but, in a review of the facts surrounding 
the defendant's motion, ruled that the legal requirements 
were satisfied by the facts as shown in affidavits. None-
theless, tl .;rt stated iii*- \ -de - Mmg forth the require-
ments Of •* ;• '•<• *-• "i • r"ll -•* '- : 
\< i> appreciated that iiu language jii^i quoted 
i necessarily a broad sounding generality; and 
: :I:JI it must be so interpreted and applied as to 
conform with basic concepts of fairness and due 
process of law. This mandates //•"' l fnn-i*iu 
corporation should not be subjected to undue dif-
ficulties from lawsuits merely because its prod-
ucts are distributed in this state or may be pur 
chased and sold by others herein." (Emphasis 
added). 
Later, h - \\*1. .;. { 7ifdt-^a lh <">>.
 r<>wlnm 
vs. Louie's Boats and Motors, u7 1 "ta.li 2d 233, 494 I* :Jd 
532, the Supreme Court held that a defendant corpora-
tion wThich allegedly committed a conversation of a do-
mestic corporation's property in Oregon was not subject 
to suit under Utah's Long Arm Statute. In that case the 
Court recognized i;n* dm- p i - v ^ ••*<;:•• t-i, <-n!> <.i Itdtf 
national Shoe vs. Washington, suj,n\ .M < ;..-; ! ilm! in 
tl;i- ti.rl aelinri r'.-.i \•.••• r nnt significant cu;it:ii-i> in 
impose jurisdiction even under Utah's broadly worded 
Long Arm Statute. The specific section of Utah's Long 
Arm Statute which was used to support the plaintiff's 
contention that jurisdiction did lie in Utah was the pre-
cise seethe .;,;;;;; which W-A ".ii'nd \\iw\\ \,in:t\\i\\. Maytex 
Manufacturing, seeks to asset? I'irisdietii.ii against the 
third-party defendant, Universal Carn< i < .innanv. Thit 
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section is Section 78-27-24 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. More specifically, the court recognized the basis of 
the claim as involving the portions of 78-27-24 relating to 
torts. 
In the Hydro swift case, the courts stated the law as 
follows: 
We disagree with the urgence of plaintiff, are 
' < unwilling to extend that case, which appears to 
- " •-•••' have inspired our Long Arm Statute, and believe 
and hold that under the circumstances related 
hereinabove the plaintiff legitimately cannot claim 
jurisdiction that might sanction this litigation in 
Utah. 
Under 78-27-22, it is stated that the provisions of 
the act apply 'to the fullest extent permitted by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . .' We believe that the same amendment 
would protect one from being subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state, where he alleg-
edly committed a tort such as claimed here, or a 
slander or the like in a sister state, but not in 
, . Utah, on grounds of denial of due process of law. 
In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court, in a decision by 
Justice Henriod, synopsized the relationship between the 
International Shoe case and the Hill vs. Zalr Corporation 
case in the case of Foreign Study League vs. Holland-
America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244. In that case 
though jurisdiction was found, the court made a number 
of significant statements. That case stressed the propo-
sition that cases such as these are "strictly factual and 
dispositive by the application of case and statutory law 
to the fact situation presented in the instant case. . . . " 
It is therefore, very important and very significant that 
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facts be carefully presented and considered and that the 
evidentiary requirements to establish facts be followed. 
Unlike the evidence presented in the Foreign Study 
League case1, there is no evidence in this action h\ M;:yn-\ 
which '<-;:; : . <•,..-;•; <.«.*:•;:• * uiversal sent 
e m p l o ; . • •<•- i * * i l iJ- ' I : ! ! : ! M - - : - • !• - '< i ; - - r - . . r 
c h i i l ; ; t i - ! > !"4ii - u i f: : t t \x, «• 11 \ * n A' v *• a ? » if* . -«- -«^ ; \ p j x - ' 
lant's extrapolations out of the air, Maytex contends 
that they bought tlu- nr-firV in Texas and -hipped it W»to 
Utah themselvr-
Aj-i-ii;.-.' '••*!* ignores .A' .-;' . • : .:i* ^ l i p r ^ ^ -
( * ii . J • 1 . • - . . . . - . i ' ; • M l * i ' • • . ; • ' '•
 ( - \ r . - - i t J ' - l l n'f ! ' M I 
case of Pellegrini vs. Sachs & s<>h. I iah 2d, 522 P.2d MM 
(1974), Vppellant attempts to distinguish the Foreign 
Study League case and the Hill case on the basis that 
they construe a different subsection of the long-arm 
statute. Though this is perhaps the case, they certainly 
have language in them wl substantial import which i> 
addressed H- U' i..,-•„: -ITM statute i\> a w huh Tin- \ p . - l 
h\u\ :*!i(t!;t-( .-u« ii]'i:- i<r distinguisli tin* Hydro swift Cor-
;».i"int., r;i>«* -;: the ground the tortious activity did not 
take place in Ttah. However, it could certainly be con-
sidered that the h'j! :: \ suffered by the Plaintiff took 
place HI I tah. in tin- instant case, Maytex apparently 
sent the assembled rack int..- I hf i. vl;u miy activity 
engaged in In I m\ ersal, took ;.;,':•••<- ::- MK Sint« o\ rIV\:is. 
As indicated above, the Appellants have placed some 
reliance in their brief on the Pellegrini case. The Pelle-
grini case contains the following; language: 
,U 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It is essential in each case that there be some act 
by which the defendant purposefully avails him-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum state, thus envoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws." 
The court then went on to recognize a distinction between 
a dealer and a manufacturer who participates "in sending 
their wares into foreign states.'' There is no evidence, 
nor is there any allegation, that Universal sent its prod-
ucts anywhere outside of Texas. The Chairman of the 
Board of Universal attests that they do not sell to any 
buyers within the State of Utah. Apparently the Maytex 
Manufacturing Company manufactures and assembles 
products it purchases. It is apparently the Maytex Manu-
facturing Company which sends their wares into foreign 
states. 
CONCLUSION 
The Universal Carrier Company submits that the 
facts in this matter must be construed as set forth in 
David J. Moorehead's Affidavit as no other facts are 
before the court. The facts set forth in that Affidavit 
contradict the allegations of jurisdiction which appear in 
Plaintiff's Complaint. As such, the trial court had no 
alternatives but to rule in favor of the Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Further, even if the facts were assumed to be as 
alleged in Plaintiff's Comi)laint and in Third-Party 
Plaintiff's Complaint, that would still not extend juris-
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diction over the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent as 
those allegations are limited in scope and do not g<> to 
the ultimate questions wliich concern jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the Respondent respectfully requests that 
the court affirm the J udgmc nt ••••*' *Vr n-i/.l "«im-t. 
OATMDlhiK NHidav of Aiaru 
TIMDALTON DUNN 
Attorney of Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent 
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